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I. Introduction
During the height of their influence, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
[ISIS] was able to recruit tens of thousands of foreign terrorist fighters 
[FTFs] from all over the world to join their jihad through the use of 
high-quality, emotionally evocative propaganda memes and videos 
posted on social media sites including Facebook, Twitter, and You-
Tube, as well as encrypted apps like WhatsApp and Telegram. ISIS 
also arose at the precise time when the newly designed immediate 
feedback mechanisms of social media allowed them to blanket the 
Internet and then sit back and wait to see who showed interest by lik-
ing, sharing, tweeting or otherwise endorsing their propaganda. Then 
they could hone in on that group to swarm, love-bomb and otherwise 
interact to move them further along the terrorist trajectory. 
Given the broad reach and efficacy of ISIS’s videos, fighting the 
propagation of their terrorist narrative has been a priority for West-
ern governments. Even with the territorial defeat of ISIS, the group 
continues to disseminate their message online, inspiring so-called 
“lone actors” to carry out attacks in their name all over the world. 
Indeed, in March of 2020, ISIS released its latest video from Kirkuk, 
entitled “Dominant Over Their Enemies.” In the video, militants boast 
of continued attacks in northern Iraq, resulting in multiple civilian and 
military fatalities.1 Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to poli-
cymakers and intelligence professionals to understand how to make 
counter narrative videos that can effectively deter would-be ISIS mem-
55
Anne Speckhard, Molly Ellenberg & Mohamed Ahmed
bers from committing terrorist attacks as well as being radicalized in 
the first place.2
Research has identified three primary means of fighting terrorist 
narratives online. The first, called “alternative narratives,” are pro-
active efforts to promote democratic values, prosocial behavior, and 
peaceful ways of enacting positive social change. A second manner 
of fighting ISIS digitally is called “government strategic communica-
tions.” These public awareness campaigns are also proactive efforts to 
explain the government’s policies and strategies regarding terrorism 
and to make people aware of violent extremism and the risk factors for 
radicalization.3 Both alternative narratives and government strategic 
communications can be extremely useful in targeting the general pub-
lic with a primary goal of awareness. When addressing populations 
who have already begun to radicalize or hold extremist beliefs, how-
ever, those measures often fall flat. For these populations, a reactive 
approach is better suited. This approach is known as the “counter nar-
rative.” Counter narratives, as the name implies, are used to directly 
contradict the narratives put forth by ISIS and other terrorist groups in 
their propaganda materials. Counter narratives may be complemented 
by alternative narratives, but people who have already been radical-
ized will not be receptive to the alternative narrative until they have 
been disavowed, or at least shaken, of their extremist beliefs.
There are four criteria crucial to creating an effective counter narra-
tive: 1) “Revealing incongruities and contradictions in the terrorist nar-
ratives and how terrorists act,” 2) “disrupting analogies between the 
target narrative and real-world events,” 3) “disrupting binary themes 
of the group’s ideology,” and 4) “advocating an alternative view of the 
terrorist narrative’s target.”4 Other recommendations include making 
sure that the counter narrative is based on valid and reliable research 
of the terrorist narrative, creating the counter narrative with an under-
standing of the radicalization process, aiming the counter narrative at 
a specific audience, using a credible messenger, and controlling the 
distribution of the counter narrative.5 Some counter narratives have 
been criticized for focusing too heavily on the terrorist ideology and 
operating under the assumption that if people no longer ascribe to the 
ideology, they will not commit a violent extremist act, and that people 
who commit violent extremist acts by definition hold violent extrem-
ist views. This ignores the many purposes, other than ideological, 
for which individuals join terrorist movements including belonging, 
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significance, a sense of purpose, dignity, empathy for the plight of oth-
ers, and a sense of duty. 
Other counter narratives have been accused of demonizing terror-
ists and their ideology to the point that they are glamorized and made 
more attractive in the eyes of the viewer. Both of these criticisms are 
merited but can be addressed in a thoughtfully created counter narra-
tive. Portraying true stories told by credible speakers allows the viewer 
to see the human cost of the acts committed by terrorist, particularly 
if it focuses as much on the cost to the terrorist him or herself. This 
approach also humanizes the violent extremists and creates a foil with 
whom the viewer may identify and to whom they may listen. Indeed, 
anyone going down a dedicated path, particularly extremism, starts 
to narrow focus to views propagated by the extremist group, thus an 
insider can be a very powerful messenger and one that may be heeded. 
When the extremists are portrayed not as purely evil monsters, but as 
complex, nuanced characters, the viewer is forced to think critically 
about their behavior, particularly if the insider makes the choice of 
going down the terrorist trajectory appear that it may not work out so 
well for the viewer. Portraying complex characters who are neither all 
good or all bad also similarly contradicts the binary nature of the mili-
tant jihadi terrorist narrative, particularly that there is only one funda-
mental and literal interpretation of the Quran and that if one wishes 
to be a “good Muslim,” they have an absolute obligation to obey the 
orders of the terrorist group.
This study provides an evaluation of a counter narrative video that 
adheres to these principles, using two focus groups, the first com-
prised of Somali-American men and the second of Somali-American 
women living in San Diego, California. Radicalization has long been a 
concern in the Somali-American community. Between 2006 and 2011, 
there was a surge in young Somali men leaving Minnesota, home of 
the highest Somali-American population in the United States, to fight 
jihad in Somalia alongside al Shabaab. This group of men was initially 
recruited by a European al Shabaab fighter who told potential recruits 
that it was their duty to defend Somali women against what he said 
was a mass rape by Kenyan soldiers. These first recruits then reached 
out to other Somali-Americans on social media to glorify the jihad, first 
in Somalia and later for the development of a Caliphate in Iraq and 
Syria.6 As of 2016, at least 20 young people, mainly Somali-Americans, 
left Minnesota to join terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, with at least 
nine Minnesotans having been arrested on such charges since 2014.7 
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The vulnerability to radicalization and recruitment by terrorist 
groups is driven by a number of factors, each particularly strong in 
young Somali-American males. A hostile surrounding environment 
is a common grievance among both Muslims and Black men, and the 
effect is compounded by the identity crisis that the individual may 
experience related to their status as an immigrant or child of an immi-
grant. Many of these young men have also experienced the traumatic 
loss of a father figure during the war in Somalia and are therefore more 
receptive to the idea of joining a supportive, even seemingly nurturing, 
group in which they completely belong religiously and ethnically.8
Given the high number and severity of risk factors for radicalization 
and subsequent action among Somali-American youth, it is impor-
tant to explore new methods of prevention. As previously noted, past 
government efforts to counter the terrorist narrative and prevent radi-
calization have been found lacking, partially due to the distrust that 
many Muslim communities feel toward the government in relation to 
countering violent extremism [CVE]. Indeed, these communities tend 
to suspect any individual working on CVE efforts of being government 
informants.9 Moreover, there have been campaigns put forth by the 
U.S. State Department (“Think Again, Turn Away”) and the UK Home 
Office that failed due to the U.S.’s mocking tone and use of violent 
footage that some believed could “legitimize terrorists,” and the UK’s 
use of cognitive, rather than emotional, arguments that fell flat when 
competing with the emotionally evocative calls of terrorist groups.10
The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism 
[ICSVE]’s Breaking the ISIS Brand – the ISIS Defectors Interviews Project is 
a response to the dearth in effective counter narratives for use in fight-
ing ISIS and other terrorist groups online. ICSVE’s over 170 counter 
narrative videos are made from a collection of interviews with over 239 
ISIS cadres and defectors, translated and subtitled into 27 languages. 
Each counter narrative video features a speaker who actually lived 
under ISIS and has either returned to their home countries, escaped 
from ISIS, or been imprisoned. These speakers’ stories mirror the emo-
tional nature of ISIS’s propaganda, but in doing so denounce the group 
as unIslamic, corrupt and overly brutal. These ISIS insiders tell their 
stories, sometimes with tears in their eyes, of watching their families 
die, seeing innocent people being executed, or being tortured them-
selves for breaking the most minor and arbitrary rule. They focus on 
the way ISIS lied to them, twisted and misused Islam, and eventually 
ruined their lives. 
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The project aims to capture the voices and emotions of credible 
defectors and imprisoned cadres and the footage used in the videos 
to illustrate what the speaker is describing is taken from actual ISIS 
propaganda. This, in essence, turns the terrorists’ propaganda on its 
head, using the defector’s voice and ISIS’s video records as a direct 
contradiction to the terrorist narrative, while diligently avoiding glo-
rifying the violent acts depicted in the ICSVE counter narrative video 
clips. It should be noted that all of the speakers in the counter narrative 
videos gave informed consent prior to having their interviews filmed 
and agreed to appear in a counter narrative denouncing ISIS, specify-
ing whether they wanted their names changed or faces blurred in the 
final product. 
Evaluating the efficacy of one of these counter narrative videos in 
these focus group settings offered ICSVE the opportunity to create an 
open dialogue with a community particularly vulnerable to violent 
extremism. In this setting, participants are able to not only provide 
feedback on the quality of the counter narrative, but also to provide 
insight into their own thoughts and experiences about ISIS, al Shabaab, 
and violent extremism in general. Counter narratives are likely the 
best way to fight ISIS’s ideology online among targeted communities 
that have already been exposed to the ideology. Therefore, receiving 
feedback from samples representative of those communities is critical.
II. Method
The participants in these two focus groups included five Somali-Amer-
ican men and five Somali-American women, all living in San Diego, 
California, a city with one of the largest Somali-American populations 
in the United States.11 The average age of the men was 25.8 while the 
average age of the women was 23.4. Of the men and women, only one 
described themselves as “middle income,” while all of the other par-
ticipants described their economic level as “lower/poor.” The partici-
pants were well educated, with three men having completed graduate 
degrees and the other two having completed undergraduate degrees. 
Of the women, one had completed an undergraduate degree, with the 
other four listing high school as their highest level of education. All of 
the participants identified as Sunni Muslim.
Focus group participants gave informed consent prior to beginning 
the study. They then completed baseline questionnaires designed to 
assess their feelings and beliefs regarding violence and extremism in 
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general, as well as regarding ISIS in particular. The questionnaires 
also asked demographic questions regarding the participant’s age, 
gender, educational level, economic level, and religion. Examples of 
the broader baseline statements, rated on a seven-point Likert scale, 
include, “Violence is unfortunately necessary to right the wrongs in 
the Muslim world,” and “Shariah can and should replace corrupt gov-
ernance structures in the Muslim world.” Examples of the more spe-
cific statements, rated on the same scale, include, “I would like to see a 
true Islamic State or Caliphate being formed that unites Muslim lands 
and peoples,” and “I identify with the version of Islam propagated by 
groups like ISIS, al Shabaab, and al Qaeda.” The end of the baseline 
questionnaire also left space for participants to answer the question, 
“What do you currently think of groups like ISIS, al Shabaab, and al 
Qaeda?” as well as write down any other comments.
After filling out the baseline questionnaire, the participants were 
shown ICSVE’s counter narrative video entitled, “Jihad is Our Way.” 
An English-language transcript of the counter narrative video is pro-
vided in Appendix A. “Jihad is Our Way” features 27-year-old Kenyan 
woman, Aisha, who, after being abandoned by her husband and hav-
ing moved to the UAE to serve as a maid, fell into militant jihadi online 
discussion groups. After being exposed to extremist ideology online 
and falling in love with her online recruiter, Aisha aspired to be a sui-
cide bomber for ISIS. When Aisha traveled to India to connect with a 
man she had met online, with whom she planned to travel to Iraq to 
fight jihad hoping to die as “martyrs” together, she was arrested by 
Indian intelligence and extradited back to Kenya, where she was con-
victed on terrorism charges. The video ends with Aisha explaining that 
the extremists on social media lied and that she should have studied 
the Quran in order to go to Paradise in a good and pure way, not by 
becoming a suicide bomber.12
The participants were then asked to fill out two follow-up question-
naires. The first was aimed at gauging the participant’s feelings about 
the video itself. For example, the first two questions on that question-
naire asked participants to circle adjectives describing first what they 
thought of the video (e.g., “crazy,” “powerful,” “unsettling”) and then 
describing how the video made them feel (e.g., “anxious,” “disgusted,” 
“proud”). The questionnaire then included statements regarding the 
counter narrative video rated on a seven-point Likert scale, including, 
“I believe that Aisha is telling the truth about her experiences with vio-
lent extremist recruiters and groups,” and “I believe this video could 
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convince someone thinking of joining ISIS or al Shabaab not to do 
so.” Finally, on the second follow-up questionnaire, participants were 
asked to rate the same statements from the baseline questionnaire, 
with the addition of one extra statement, “This video made me think 
more negatively about violent extremist groups like ISIS, al Qaeda, 
and al Shabaab.”
III. Results
The participants in the focus groups have many of the demographic 
risk factors for radicalization, particularly their age and low socioeco-
nomic status. However, they were not as highly exposed to or inclined 
toward terrorist ideology as the intended audience for counter-narra-
tives. None of the women and four of the men (40% of the total sample) 
had ever discussed the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Somalia with others. 
None of the participants had watched ISIS, al Qaeda, and al Shabaab’s 
online videos, and 80% did not agree with the statement, “I find some 
of the claims of groups like ISIS, al Shabaab and al Qaeda to be compel-
ling.” The two men who did endorse the statement rated it as 2 and 3 
on the seven-point Likert scale. None of the participants said that liv-
ing under ISIS or al Shabaab was appealing to them.
There were no significant differences between the participants’ base-
line and post-test scores on the questionnaires. This is likely due to all 
of the participants having held negative ideas of ISIS and al Shabaab 
from the outset of the focus groups, so their views were unlikely to 
change after watching a counter narrative that confirmed their previ-
ously held beliefs. 
Although the participants’ views did not change across time, there 
was some disagreement among the participants regarding some of the 
broader statements given on the questionnaires. These discrepancies 
were all gender-based, indicating that the men in the focus group, 
despite their negative views of ISIS, were more supportive of beliefs 
consistent with Islamic extremist ideology. For the baseline ques-
tionnaire, on the statements, “People’s desire to engage in violence 
is mostly driven by injustices and the desire to defend the weak and 
hopeless,” “Western powers, in collaboration with local bad gover-
nance, are responsible for the mistreatment and humiliation of Mus-
lims around the world,” “Shariah can and should replace corrupt 
governance structures in the Muslim world,” and “I would like to see a 
true Islamic State or Caliphate being formed that unites Muslim lands 
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and peoples,” men gave average ratings of 3.6, 4.8, 5.6, and 4.2, respec-
tively. In contrast, women gave the first statement an average rating of 
1.4, with only one woman rating the statement higher than 1. On the 
three subsequent statements above, the women gave unanimous rat-
ings of 1, indicating their complete disagreement.
More minor gender differences also appeared regarding statements 
related to exposure to narratives and their potential response to coun-
ter narratives. On average, men rated the statement, “I sometimes 
discuss with others the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Somalia,” as 3.4, 
whereas women were once again unanimous in their complete dis-
agreement. Men also rated the statement, “I would believe someone 
who has just returned from ISIS or al Shabaab about their experiences 
inside the group,” higher than women, with the two groups rating that 
statement 3.2 and 1.2, respectively.
As noted above, the scores for the same statements given after 
watching the counter narrative did not differ significantly and the gen-
der differences remained constant.
While the participants’ responses were generally consistent when 
asked about their thoughts about ISIS, al Shabaab, and Islam, their 
perspectives on the counter narrative video itself were more variable 
and appeared to be less gender-based. After watching the video, the 
participants were asked to circle adjectives from lists regarding, first, 
what they thought of the video, and second, how the video made them 
feel. Among the first set of words, the most commonly endorsed was 
“heartbreaking” (endorsed by six participants), followed by “horrible” 
and “sad,” each endorsed by three participants. Among the second 
set of words, the most commonly endorsed was “ashamed,” which 
was endorsed by three participants, followed by “horrified” and “ner-
vous,” each endorsed by two participants.
Overall, the participants viewed the speaker as a credible messen-
ger, rating the statements “I believe Aisha is who she says she is,” and 
“I believe that Aisha is telling the truth about her experiences with vio-
lent extremist recruiters and groups,” as 6.2 and 6.6, respectively. This 
was a positive response in that a counter narrative featuring a terrorist 
insider lacks power if viewers doubt that it is even an authentic terror-
ist testimony. 
When asked about their thoughts on her story, beyond its veracity, 
men and women differed in that men were slightly less likely than 
women to agree with the statement, “I think Alisha’s heartbreak and 
isolation working in the Gulf made her vulnerable to violent extremist 
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recruitment,” (average ratings of 4.6 and 7, respectively). Regarding 
a different possible motivation for Aisha, women were far less likely 
than men to agree with the statement, “I think Aisha was already sui-
cidal when she got involved with these violent extremists,” (average 
ratings of 1.6 and 5.2, respectively). 
The participants agreed least in regard to the efficacy of the video. 
For the statement, “This video affects my opinion on how I feel about 
groups like ISIS and al Shabaab,” the participants returned scores with 
the spread: 1, 1, 2, 2, 4, 4, 5, 6, 6, 7. This spread reflects the participants’ 
insight into their previous anti-ISIS and anti-al Shabaab views and 
their awareness that a video that supported their views would not 
have a large impact on them. In contrast, the spread for the statement, 
“I believe this video could convince someone thinking of joining ISIS 
or al Shabaab not to do so,” was far narrower and more negatively 
skewed: 1, 4, 6, 6, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7. This indicates that the participants 
recognized that although the video did not affect their already nega-
tive views of ISIS, it might have a greater impact on people who held 
neutral or positive views of ISIS prior to watching the video.
IV. Comments
On the baseline questionnaires, most participants described their 
views toward ISIS when asked for additional comments in a straight-
forward manner: “They don’t represent Islam!”, “they are crazy,” and 
“they are very unIslamic and should be stopped,” while others focused 
on actions rather than ideology: “They kill innocent women and chil-
dren.” Because the participants who wrote comments in addition 
to rating the given statements expressed exclusively negative views 
of ISIS, it is perhaps unsurprising that the comments written after 
the participants viewed the counter narrative did not demonstrate a 
change of heart: “They need to study the real Islam that the majority of 
Muslims practice,” “Islam is Peace and these guys are making us look 
like we are evil.”
Some comments written after watching the video, however, indi-
cated insight into the path toward radicalization, in addition to the evil 
of ISIS: “I feel many people are not understanding the real problem 
how anyone can be brainwashed.” The same participant also wrote, “I 
was horrified watching this video, I think you should show the entire 
Somali community.” This is a good indication of confidence in these 
counter narrative videos to convince, protect against and prevent ter-
rorist recruitment.
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The participants provided more insight into their reactions to the 
counter narrative during the facilitated oral discussion. The partici-
pants commented that the video was “heartbreaking” and “horrible 
and scary,” with one man stating, “It seemed a little depressing too, 
it’s not cool killing people especially saying it’s for my deen (religion).” 
Regarding how the video made him feel, the same man responded, 
“It kind of makes me feel anxious just because there is too much kill-
ing and bombing in Somalia and Kenya as well. I wonder how we are 
going to fix this.” Two other participants expressed shame at being 
associated with extremist violence. One man said in response to the 
same question, “I would probably say ashamed, because she’s Somali 
and Muslim; she’s screwing her name over, and now I bet there’s going 
to be movies and books about this.” Another man agreed: “I would say 
ashamed, too but I would also add there the biggest disappointment is 
using religion; every culture has bad people but being Muslim is repre-
senting an entire faith; this needs to stop and be controlled.” 
Regarding the credibility of the speaker, the men in particular 
expressed doubts about Aisha’s expression of remorse as well as her 
experience. When asked to explain why he did not believe Aisha was 
remorseful, one man said, “Because she’s not even emotional, how are 
your intentions to kill people and when God brings you back from 
committing that you’re just cool about it and keeping it pushing? She’s 
not even crying or shaking when she’s talking about.” He may not rec-
ognize the emotional numbing that may occur in a traumatized indi-
vidual, particularly one who has landed in prison as a result of being 
tricked. Another man responded to his cohort, “Yeah that makes sense, 
but she could be reading a script too. Overall not everyone can be 
emotional; people can be different emotionally.” Her lack of emotion 
also led the men to doubt the accuracy of Aisha’s story. Said one man, 
“I don’t think she’s telling the truth, just my personal opinion if you’re 
willing to kill people you would not be comfortable talking about. It 
could be she has experience in killing people too and she doesn’t give 
a damn.” Another added, “I also believe she could be hiding some-
thing, or she had involvements in other terrorist attacks. So basically, 
I believe she’s telling the truth but not the entire truth.” According to 
the Kenyan police and her trial, Aisha had not killed anyone and was 
stopped before being sent on her suicide mission.
The Somali-American men also speculated about Aisha’s vulner-
abilities to recruitment by al Shabaab and ISIS. When the facilitator 
asked if the group thought that Aisha’s isolation while working in 
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the United Arab Emirates made her vulnerable, the men volunteered 
a new explanation reflecting typical Somali experiences and views 
of Kenya: “I think her experiences in Kenya had to do with this; she 
doesn’t talk about her bad experience but Somali communities there 
are being abused. That’s where al Shabaab comes in to save the day 
type of thing,” said one. Two others agreed, adding, “Well I don’t see 
much terrorist attacks in the UAE, basically people go there to party, 
and I think she was vulnerable inside Kenya.” “Yes, it’s Kenya not 
really UAE they got lots of money to give people in terms of work and 
lifestyle even though they abuse Africans.”
The men also agreed that Aisha was manipulated, even brain-
washed, into wanting to become a suicide bomber, commenting, “I 
think she was radicalized to be suicidal, these groups are heavily going 
after women because they’re more vulnerable and easier to deceive 
than men,” and “I think she was brainwashed like all the millions of 
Somalis that are brainwashed by al Shabaab.” Although Aisha was 
recruited by a man, the focus group participants shared the belief that 
women are often the recruiters, with one commenting, “How do you 
think these girls are marrying jihadists; it’s because other women are 
wheeling [sic] them in.”
Regarding the efficacy of the counter narrative, the men agreed 
that the video did not change their previously-held negative feelings 
about ISIS and al Shabaab, but some mentioned that the video made 
them “think we need to be more aggressive in ending them once for all 
[sic]!” When the facilitator asked whether the “video could convince 
someone thinking of joining ISIS or al Shabaab not to do so,” the men 
agreed that it might be more useful for those who had yet to be fully 
radicalized, as well as the general public, commenting, “It’s helpful in 
the sense of someone who’s thinking about joining, but not for some-
one who’s made up their mind already,” and “It’s helpful and good; I 
think the best way to kill them by public opinion; show the video to 
everyone, especially Somalis.” This also was a strong vote of confi-
dence in the efficacy of these counter narrative videos to potentially 
protect and prevent terrorist recruitment.
The women discussed the video separately from the men but echoed 
their descriptions of the video and their own feelings as “heartbreak-
ing,” “horrible,” and “nervous.” The women found the speaker more 
credible than the men did, with only one woman commenting that “it 
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could also be that she’s not telling the whole story.” In contrast to the 
men, who noted Aisha’s lack of emotion, one woman stated, “I can 
hear her pain and suffer [sic],” and two other women agreed. 
In regard to the question related to Aisha’s isolation in the UAE, 
the women, like the men, introduced new possible vulnerabilities. 
Instead of expressing a belief that the treatment of Somalis in Kenya 
was a factor, the women focused on mental health, explaining, “People 
can have issues dealing with [mental health problems] and people 
can exploit that,” and “These people who are killing and blowing 
themselves up are all dealing with mental health problems.” Another 
woman responded to the previous comment, “Maybe, but that is an 
issue in the community, especially Somali community. We don’t think 
mental health affects us at all.” As with all focus groups run with the 
ICSVE counter narratives this reflects an observation of vulnerabilities 
in the “at risk” community that was evoked by the video and is likely 
important to consider. Overall, the women were less verbose than the 
men and did not elaborate extensively on the statements they rated 
after watching the video.
V. Discussion
The results of these two focus groups indicate that ICSVE’s counter 
narrative videos are emotionally evocative, a key characteristic of ISIS’s 
propaganda videos. Nine participants responded that the video “made 
me think more negatively about violent extremist groups like ISIS, 
al Qaeda and al Shabaab,” rating the statement as five or greater on 
the seven-point scale. Given the participants’ initial negative views of 
ISIS, however, it cannot be determined how people with more radical 
ideologies may be affected by the counter narratives. However, eight 
participants rated the statement, “I believe this video could convince 
someone thinking of joining ISIS or al Shabaab not to do so,” as five or 
greater. Indeed, based on the participants’ discussions, it appears that 
ICSVE’s counter narratives may be most effective with people consid-
ering joining violent extremist groups who have been partially, but not 
fully, radicalized. There is previous evidence, however, that ICSVE’s 
counter narratives have the potential to make even the most die-hard 
extremists admit their mistakes and the contradictions between their 
ideology and their actions as when an actual ISIS emir watched two of 
them.13
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The results of this study also confirm that ICSVE’s counter narra-
tive model adheres to the criteria put forth by previous researchers. 
The participants agreed that the video “revealed incongruities and 
contradictions,” as demonstrated by their unanimous rating of 7 for 
the statement, “ISIS is a corrupt organization,” and unanimous rat-
ing of 1 on the statement, “The extremist behaviors, as described here, 
are righteous according to Islam,” both answered after watching the 
video. This consensus regarding the incongruity of the terrorist narra-
tive with actual experiences inside the group exists despite variability 
in the male participants’ agreement with various extremist statements 
presented in the questionnaire prior to watching the video. In relation 
to the counter narrative’s ability to “disrupt analogies between the 
target narrative and real-world events” and to “disrupt binary themes 
of the group’s ideology,” the results of this study could not reveal a 
causal effect of the video, as the participants’ perspectives of the terror-
ist ideology did not change after watching the video. Although some 
of the men agreed with some of ISIS’s ideology, both before and after 
watching the video, such as the desire for shariah to replace corrupt 
government structures and the desire for a Caliphate to unite Muslim 
lands and people, none of the men endorsed any violent acts. Addi-
tionally, none of the participants endorsed the statement, “I disagree 
with the methods of engagement (e.g. beheadings, etc.) of groups like 
ISIS, al Shabaab and al Qaeda, but I support their overall objectives.” 
This suggests that the men who did agree with the aforementioned 
extremist statements did not view them as part of ISIS’s overall objec-
tive. Perhaps they have come to the same conclusion as many scholars 
studying the media coverage of ISIS, namely that religion is the ratio-
nalization, rather than the root cause.14 Future studies would be well-
served by inquiring as to what the focus group participants viewed 
as ISIS and al Shabaab’s primary objectives: a true Caliphate, or an 
authoritarian group’s accumulation of territory and power disguised 
as an idyllic utopia. Such a view could also reflect the prevalence of 
the belief among many Somalis that religion is inextricably linked to 
governing, and that governmental failures are due to too much secu-
larization, rather than not enough.15 The focus group participants also 
agreed that the counter narrative “advocated an alternative view of the 
terrorist narrative’s target.” During the discussion portion of the male 
focus group, one man astutely commented, “all this stuff of killing 
is unbeatable in our faith and way of life. I do understand that some 
people might be interpreting our Quran and Islam to their personal 
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agenda and it’s us that should be stopping them.” The men were also 
able to distinguish between the concepts advocated in the terrorist nar-
ratives and the alternative, prosocial ways of addressing them. When 
asked, “Do you believe going to fight jihad in places like Syria and Iraq 
is the action of a good Muslim?”, one man responded, 
“If human beings are being abused and killed we have an obligation to 
stop that – but in this case it’s so-called Muslims who are killing every-
one. I don’t see people going to fight against al Shabaab and ISIS. It’s a 
disgrace.”
Another added that “being a good Muslim is keeping the peace and 
respecting differences of faith, culture and everything else.” A third 
man’s answer to the same question, however, revealed the difficulty in 
enacting CVE programs in Muslim communities. He said, “Jihad has 
been given a completely different meaning; it’s an agenda by the media 
to make Muslims look evil. You should go for the real jihad which is 
to help people live a better life not to destroy humanity.” This state-
ment implies that he believes that it is not necessarily the terrorists, but 
rather the media, as a representative of the larger Western or secular 
society, that has co-opted and corrupted the word “jihad.” Although 
this man’s understanding of the concept of “jihad” is not extremist, 
someone with this belief may still be susceptible to recruitment by ISIS, 
as many foreign fighters were, thinking that he would be traveling to 
Syria to provide humanitarian aid. Moreover, the belief that the media 
has changed the meaning of “jihad” is consistent with the terrorist nar-
rative that the West is at war with Islam and that mainstream media 
reports of ISIS’s atrocities should not be trusted.
The hallmark of ICSVE’s counter narrative model is the use of real 
ISIS members and defectors as messengers, and this was arguably the 
most successful aspect of the counter narrative tested in these two 
focus groups. While some participants thought Aisha may not have 
been completely truthful about her involvement in ISIS, none of the 
participants doubted that Aisha was who she said she was or sug-
gested that she may have been play-acting. Their responses to the 
questions about what they thought about the video and how they felt 
reflect the empathy that the viewers had toward the speaker. The fact 
that the participants used words like “heartbreaking,” “tragic,” and 
“sad,” demonstrates the nuances of Aisha’s story. The terrorist narra-
tive is binary, so the endorsement of such complex feelings represents 
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a deviation from the emotions evoked by terrorist propaganda, such 
as “angry” or “proud,” which do not require contemplation of sub-
sequent action based on those emotions. The words endorsed by the 
participants are emotions that require thought and discussion, both of 
which are important aspects of deradicalization.
Thus, the testing of this counter narrative in two focus groups of 
male and female individuals representative of an at-risk religious-eth-
nic group in the U.S. proved a success.  Further studies along the same 
lines need to be conducted to learn even more but it is clear that using 
ISIS and al Shabaab insiders to counter message against this group 
resonates with at-risk individuals and is judged to be an effective way 
of potentially protecting against and preventing terrorist recruitment. 
Given that it only takes one or two persons to mount a lethal home-
grown attack, this is a significant step toward success in the CVE field.
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Appendix A 
Transcript of Jihad is Our Way
In Paradise, there is eternal life there.  
There is no dying there.
So, there is no need of staying in this world. 
AISHA 
27-year-old  
Kenyan ISIS Suicide Bomber 
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I’m striving to go to jannah, 
to go to Paradise.
There I’ll live forever. 
Actually, to be honest,
I just wanted  
to be a suicide bomber.
Anticipating what it would be like to explode herself in a crowded 
place and become a “martyr,” Aisha became filled with a mystical 
ecstasy.
I just feel like I’m just alone on the air  
and a little wind coming towards me.
I felt like I was flying,  
but I was not high [on drugs].
Aisha learned about violent extremist groups like ISIS, Boko Haram 
and al Shabaab through social media groups. 
There is this woman, an Islamic woman,  
who was dressed up in all black
with stockings and gloves and niqaab 
and she was holding an AK 47.
And, on her gloves, there was this flag  
of [the] Islamic State. She was dressing good. 
So I loved it, I loved it, I loved it so very much,  
so I used to like those posts.
While working in the United Arab Emirates, Aisha met a fellow  
violent extremist online who was living in Hyderabad, India.
She fell in love with him. 
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They conspired to go to Iraq to join ISIS and fight militant jihad 
together.
[Online extremists claimed] somebody  
who is not in our religion is a kuffar [unbeliever]
and a kuffar is our enemy. 
In the Quran, it is said, ‘When you see them  
in the field [of battle], just cut off their heads.’
[In the online extremist groups,]  
we used to say, ‘Jihad is our way, 
so we’re going to do jihad until somebody dies.’
Aisha’s employers in Abu Dhabi didn’t know that Aisha was preparing 
for militant jihad against people like them. 
Those people were Shia and  
[online extremists claimed that]
[the] Islamic faith are against Shia, you know.
They used to call them pigs.
Aisha says she had second thoughts about potentially killing Shia 
because she had emotionally connected with her Shia employer.
I didn’t want it to be like that.
I used to love her.
Yeah, she was so kind to me.  
She was so good.
Every time that thought comes,  
I just ignore it.
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 I just ignore it because they were very good,  
though they were Shias, but they were very good.
Aisha never had the chance to carry out her suicide mission.
While traveling in India, Indian intelligence arrested and interrogated 
her. She was extradited back to Kenya where she was convicted on ter-
rorism charges.
Aisha has since changed her beliefs on suicide attacks and militant 
jihadi groups.
They were lying.  
They twist things.
If you believe these lies,  
You’ll get separated from your family.
Another thing,  
you don’t want to go to hell.
If you are a Muslim, you have to study the Quran well  
and know what the Quran says.
So, don’t stick to those social media things  
and avoid these things about [militant] jihad.
It is not good for you.
Jannah, I pray to God that I go, 
but not in [the militant] jihad way.
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